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ABSTRACT
Francis Dupuis-Déri confronts the domestication of radical ideas in his superb and sti-
mulating essay, “Global Protestors Versus Global Elites: Are Direct Action and Deliberative
Politics Compatible?”, and leads to the intriguing claim that the legitimacy of radical anti-
capitalist protest rests ultimately on its internally deliberative quality. This account, ho-
wever compelling as it stands in many ways, seems to give undue predominance to
legitimacy claims. The problem of democracy and global capitalism today is that the glo-
bal justice movement’s designated constituency does not exist as an actor, for the simple
reason that the majority of its putative members have yet to accept the problem forwar-
ded by the global justice movement. People must be convinced to join movements against
corporate control, democratic weakening, and income inequality ; fortifying legitimacy
among the already committed does not seem to be helping. 
RÉSUMÉ
Francis Dupuis-Déri aborde la domestication des idées radicales dans son superbe et sti-
mulant article sur la compatibilité entre l’action directe et la politique délibérative. Les
thèses présentées conduisent à la position plutôt étonnante que la légitimité des pro-
testations radicales et anticapitalistes repose en fin de compte sur leur qualité délibéra-
tive interne. Aussi convaincante soit-elle à bien des égards, cette analyse semble conférer
une prédominance excessive aux revendications de légitimité. Le problème actuel de la dé-
mocratie et du capitalisme mondial est que le mouvement altermondialiste n’existe pas
en tant qu'acteur, pour la simple raison que la majorité de ses membres présumés n'ont
pas encore saisi le problème décrié par le mouvement altermondialiste. Les gens doivent
être convaincus de rejoindre les mouvements sociaux contre le contrôle des entreprises,
contre l’affaiblissement démocratique et contre l'inégalité des revenus ; le fait de fortifier
la légitimité des revendications à des personnes déjà convaincues ne semble pas être de
la plus grande aide. 
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At least in the global North, the domestication of once-radical ideas is pervasive
across many areas of social life. Transitions from social unionism to business
unionism, from community animation to “partnerships” and “capacity-build-
ing,” from social movement multiculturalism to its neoliberalized variant—in
political discourse and practice, these moves and others illustrate the trend of
democratic narrowing so characteristic of our era. The contemporary academy
is no exception, either. Compare John Dewey’s notion of social capital as col-
lectively harnessed knowledge in the service of egalitarian democratization to
Robert Putnam’s use of the same term to describe the civic ties and trust fostered
by voluntary associations.1 Recall Carole Pateman’s emphasis on democratized
workplaces as avenues to increased civic competence in light of James Fishkin’s
more recent promotion of deliberative polling as issue-specific citizen educa-
tion.2 Indeed, also notice the frequent contemporary use of “deliberation” to
characterize what amount to managed focus-group consultations among pre-
designated “stakeholder” groups.3
Francis Dupuis-Déri confronts these trends in his superb and stimulating essay,
“Global Protestors Versus Global Elites: Are Direct Action and Deliberative Pol-
itics Compatible?”4 His basic starting point is the manifold deliberative defi-
ciencies of the core institutions of global neoliberalization. For example,
powerful states at the World Trade Organization use debt and aid threats to en-
sure decisions favouring their interests; similarly, World Bank decision rules al-
locate votes proportionally based on member “shareholding,” accomplishing the
same objective with starkly antidemocratic frankness.5 Dupuis-Déri also points
out that the proffered justifications for this kind of capitalist fundamentalism are
anti-deliberative themselves; the plainly stated goal is, after all, to insulate mar-
kets from the supposed irrationality of public choice.6
1
There is of course more to the article than this. Dupuis-Déri’s first key claim
follows from his insistence that the militantly confrontational actions of global
protestors are not simply tactical manoeuvres aimed at particular substantive
policy ends; instead, their occupations, marches, blockades, and similarly sum-
mit-disrupting moves must be grasped as deliberative acts in their own right.
They explain, publicize, and expose the devastating impact of purposefully hid-
den processes and decisions; and they voice the concerns of those directly af-
fected by, but yet unreasonably excluded from, international capitalism’s myriad
pseudo- and anti-deliberations, thus stimulating new currents of global imagi-
nation and discussion. Hence Dupuis-Déri’s first key claim: “confrontational ac-
tion may be viewed as a means to improve the quality of deliberation and to
move … toward a more participatory regime.”7
This path of argument also leads Dupuis-Déri to an intriguing second claim.
This claim is that the legitimacy of radical anti-capitalist protest rests ultimately
on its internally deliberative quality.8 For Dupuis-Déri, basing confrontation on
a deliberative justification makes determining its internally deliberative charac-
ter crucial. Accordingly, perhaps the article’s most distinctive contribution is toV
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turn the classic mantra of “being the change you wish to see” into a more spe-
cific ethic of constraint for protest planning and decisions. This connection be-
tween a deliberative justification for confrontational protest and a normative
insistence on protest’s internally deliberative quality establishes a usable activist
bulwark against movement oligarchization, a strong riposte to accusations of
mob rule, and a conceptual normative basis for building deliberative-democra-
tic counter-publics. In these constructive ways, then, Dupuis-Déri’s attack on
the democratic deficiencies of the contemporary globalization era bucks the pre-
vailing tide and returns the notion of deliberation to its radical roots.
In its basic boldness and in its evaluative focus on internal deliberation, I also
think Dupuis-Déri’s argument superior to a similar yet ultimately competing ac-
count. The competitor account is that of Archon Fung, who also argues for the
deliberative legitimacy of forms of protest that are dismissed more typically as
mob disruption.9 Fung’s particular concern is the deliberative literature’s tradi-
tional insistence on social equality as a vital prerequisite of fair deliberation,
which, he argues, has made deliberation an emptily hypothetical and thus end-
lessly deferred goal. For Fung, the progressive deliberative democrat must fig-
ure out how to advance socially transformative deliberative ideals in manifestly
unequal circumstances. So, he asks: what to do when social inequalities and elite
intransigence make deliberation impossible? And like Dupuis-Déri, Fung argues
that in such circumstances relatively confrontational approaches may not only
be appropriate but can actually be justified as deliberative moves in their own
right. 
For Fung, it is deliberatively legitimate to abandon straightforwardly dialogical
and discursive attempts at “persuasion” in favour of tactics more commonly as-
sociated with power politics and “coercion”—but provided that two basic con-
ditions are met. First, standard “persuasive” avenues must really be foreclosed.
Second, any departure from deliberative tactics must be calibrated so as not to
exceed the deliberative shortcomings of the circumstances: abandoning the de-
liberative purist’s refusal to fight fire with fire shouldn’t mean going berserk at
the first hint of anything less than full compliance.10 Accordingly, Fung argues
that traditionally coercive tactics, such as mocking and shaming public figures
or occupying public buildings, are deliberatively justified when good faith efforts
at conventional deliberation have been unreasonably rebuffed, and when the de-
parture from deliberative norms is not disproportionate to the circumstances.
This, then, is Fung’s account of “deliberative activism”: an approach adapted to
the here and now of the fallen present but still fully within and fully committed
to advancing the deliberative tradition of the free and fair public exchange of
public reasons.11
So both thinkers contend that what Fung calls “coercive” rather than “persua-
sive” approaches may, at least potentially, be understood as principled deliber-
ative  moves  whose  legitimacy  is  to  be  judged  and  defended  in
deliberative-democratic terms. Where they start to diverge is when it comes to
drawing the line between deliberative and non-deliberative protest. As we haveV
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seen, Dupuis-Déri argues that various direct action tactics, including not only
blockades and political trespassing, but perhaps also in some cases the destruc-
tion of property, can be deliberative acts aimed at enlarging imagination, am-
plifying the voices of the silenced, and prompting discussion about alternatives.
When faced with antidemocratic and undeliberative forms of decision-making
whose results have destructive impacts on the purposefully excluded, it may be
legitimate to use militant, confrontational tactics.  
But how would it be possible to tell? Fung requires deliberative activists to make
good-faith deliberative efforts and then to calibrate their response to the inten-
sity of the obstacles preventing conventional deliberation. Dupuis-Déri also con-
siders the issue of deliberative obstacles; he argues that the rule-formation and
goods-allocation processes of capitalist global governance violate the basic
tenets of deliberative politics. Yet after reaching this basic judgment of anti-de-
liberative unfairness, Dupuis-Déri looks in a different direction. As noted earlier,
what is ultimately decisive in Dupuis-Déri’s account of activist deliberative le-
gitimacy is whether the protestors’ own decision-making processes are inter-
nally deliberative themselves. When facing the anti-deliberative unfairness so
typical of the rule-formation and goods-allocation processes of capitalist global
governance, then, “collective actions of disobedience and resistance [that] are by
and large the result of a participative deliberative process [may] be seen as le-
gitimate according to the normative framework of deliberative politics.”12
Fung disagrees. It is not that Fung is particularly concerned to pronounce radi-
cal action illegitimate; he simply thinks that truly confrontational protest tends
to cross a line, beyond which judgments of legitimacy can no longer rest on de-
liberative grounds. These “beyond the line” cases are precisely the ones with
which Dupuis-Déri is concerned. Fung calls them cases of “incorrigible hostil-
ity,” ones where, despite good-faith efforts at persuasion, gross inequalities of
power and implacable elite opposition leave open no deliberative route—not
even a deliberative activist one—to advancing deliberation.13 Like Dupuis-Déri,
the quintessential case that Fung has exactly in mind is “The governance
arrangements that set the terms of world trade and international finance among
states.”14 But Fung rejects Dupuis-Déri’s deliberative justification for con-
frontational militancy. Instead, he says of the militant encounter with incorrigi-
ble hostility: “In this degenerative category in which deliberation is ex hypothesi
impossible  to  advance,  the  deliberative  activist  becomes  an  activist  sim-
pliciter.”15 Thus, for Fung the question of legitimacy in situations of incorrigi-
ble hostility is simply not a deliberative one. It is instead a matter of whether the
protest actions employed fall into the range of “otherwise permissible political
tactics” in liberal-democratic pluralism. 
My sympathies here tend to lie with Dupuis-Déri. By rejecting deliberative jus-
tifications in situations of incorrigible hostility, Fung abandons Dupuis-Déri’s in-
ternal deliberative constraint on protest planning and action. If we are on the
ground of standardly “coercive” interest-group pluralism, then whatever forms
of internal organization appear tactically effective or are imposed by groupV
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elites—and are “otherwise permissible”—are the ones to be used. This leaves
radicals with no internal democratic ethic at all save the rules of a liberal polit-
ical system and philosophy many of them reject. Moreover, if we restrict delib-
erative considerations only to those situations where hostility is corrigible then
we are segregating deliberative ideals away from any confrontation with the
deepest injustices of our time. On this score, it is surely telling that Fung’s two
examples of legitimate deliberative activism involve a state-organized health
consultation process in which low-income groups were under-represented and an
elite university that proved stubbornly unresponsive in the face of a living wage
campaign.16
2
Yet, despite these differences, Fung and Dupuis-Déri approach the question of
deliberation and protest in a broadly similar way. For both, the primary task is
determining legitimacy.  They certainly push our understanding of deliberative
legitimacy beyond the conventional focus on considering and exchanging rea-
sons, with Dupuis-Déri going further than Fung by insisting that, in some cases,
the boundaries of deliberative legitimacy are likely to lie well beyond the bounds
of what are standardly permissible. But do these authors make a mistake in treat-
ing the present era’s quintessential problem troika of global capitalism, demo-
cratic narrowing, and incorrigible hostility primarily from the standpoint of
legitimacy? 
This is not a complaint about the sub-disciplines of ethics and moral philosophy.
Rather, it is about what seems to me the undue predominance of legitimacy
claims in some areas of contemporary social movement politics. Claims of le-
gitimacy are in many ways essential and inevitable. In social movement cam-
paigns, they respond to accusations of wrongfulness and galvanize group
members; they say, “the cause is just, right is on our side—we are entitled to do
this.” This kind of insistence is especially important in cases where the group
doing the claiming is what U.S. jurisprudence calls “discrete and insular,” that
is, sociologically bounded and defined in ways that make oppression and mar-
ginalization all too easy and appeals to shared understandings and interests ex-
traordinarily difficult.  Classic, indisputable cases involve oppressed minorities
under the thumb of determinedly unjust and intransigent majorities (as was so
clearly the case for African-Americans in the Jim Crow South) and tyrannized
majorities confronting police-state controlling minorities (as was so clearly the
case in apartheid South Africa). 
In these kinds of situations, although change is imperative, attempts at persua-
sion and even coercion (at least of the permissible, interest-group liberalism va-
riety) tend to be useless. Appeals to legitimacy then become indispensable,
first-order business. Departures from peaceable or normally sanctioned forms of
political participation have to be justified, particularly to potential participants
who may be hesitant about taking steps in unfamiliar, radical directions. So ar-
guments of legitimacy say to group members: “join the cause; it is just; we are
defending our rights.” V
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To some extent, protestors in confrontation with global capitalism might seem
to fit the bill. As Dupuis-Déri explains, they are adversely affected, silenced,
and repressed. They face “exclusion, profound inequalities of power, and coer-
cive attitudes.”17 But they also lack exactly what the social movement appeal to
legitimacy in “discrete and insular” cases presumes: a clear, pre-existing sense
of solidarity and belonging on whose basis other group members might be ex-
pected to move from being passively supportive bystanders to active resistors.
When strong pre-existing bases of solidarity and identity among the affected
make the motivation for protest clear and the identity of the oppressor certain,
what really matters is fortifying the group’s determination to go beyond the nor-
mally expected and sanctioned means of complaint. Insisting on legitimacy in
these cases is basic and essential. 
But in the overdeveloped countries at least, this is manifestly not the situation
facing global capitalism’s critics today. Except perhaps among the very tight cir-
cles of committed activists who have bonded over past experiences of police re-
pression, there is very little in the way of pre-existing senses of identity and
belonging on which to draw. The problem is not primarily one of convincing
some already or incipiently constituted actor to move to an uncustomary mode
of action with insistences of moral rightness.  It is instead one of convincing
outsiders and sceptics that there is a nest of inter-related problems—say, corpo-
rate control, democratic weakening, and income inequality—that a not-yet-
existent majority must be created to fight. The core question is not about tactical
legitimacy but about building support for movement objectives. And on this
question, the very attitude of legitimacy that legitimacy arguments aim to instil
is counterproductive. 
The problem of democracy and global capitalism today is that the global justice
movement’s designated constituency—“the people” in Dupuis-Déri’s essay, or
the “99%” in still more recent renderings—does not exist as an actor. It does
not so exist for the simple reason that the majority of its putative members have
yet to accept the problem construction forwarded by the global justice move-
ment. Constructing such an actor requires projects of democratic persuasion that
reach out across multiple kinds of group lines. People must be convinced to join
movements against corporate control, democratic weakening, and income in-
equality. Fortifying extant convictions of legitimacy among the longstanding
ranks of the already committed does not seem to be helping in the key task of
building strong progressive majorities.  V
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